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T
he commemoration in 2003 of the seventieth 
anniversary of the Great Ukrainian Famine has 
brought the tragedy to the forefront of Ukrainian 
domestic and foreign affairs. Despite the opposition of 
the Communists and the indifference of much of the 
former Soviet nomenklatura, the parliament passed a 
resolution recognizing the famine as genocide and 
placing blame on the Soviet authorities.1 The Ukrainian 
government had initiated an action in the United Nations 
to recognize the genocidal nature of the famine. Here, 
however, the Russian delegation seems to have opposed 
the Ukrainian initiative behind the scenes. Calls from 
civic organizations, such as Ukraine's Memorial, that 
Moscow issue an acknowledgment and an apology have 
met with dismissal and even derision by the Russian 
ambassador to Ukraine, Viktor Chernomyrdin, and by 
Vladimir Putin. As in so many questions of Ukrainian- 
Russian relations, dialogue has not even begun.2
The relatively short time since the fall of the Soviet
Union and the opening up of archival materials explains 
why attention has focused on gathering new evidence and 
studying specific events in Soviet history rather than on 
constructing new syntheses and tackling complex 
abstract issues, such as the nature of Russian-Ukrainian 
relations.3 At the same time, the emergence of
1 On the parliamentary hearings, see Parlamentars'ki slukhannia 
shchodo shanuvannia pam'iati zhertv holodomoru 1932-1933 rokiv 12 
liutoho 2003 r. (Kyiv, 2003).
2 On discussions of international recognition of the Famine as
genocide, see Ukrains'ka pravda www.pravda.com.ua, 25 September 
2003, "Kuchma ziznavsia, shcho ne khoche 'zvodyty rakhunky' za 
Holodomor-33."
3 Some of the questions of Ukrainian-Russian relations in the Soviet
period are addressed in the introduction and essays in Andreas Kappeler,
independent Russian and Ukrainian states has focused 
attention in both states on writing national history rather 
than on re-examining the relations of the two peoples and 
cultures within the Soviet Union. Indeed, the breakdown 
of scholarly contacts and even the exchange of literature 
have discouraged such discussions between what are now 
two historiographies that have developed out of the 
disintegration of Soviet historiography. The remarks that 
follow are intended to raise some of the issues of 
Russian-Ukrainian relations that should be examined in 
discussions of the Famine of 1932-33. They aim to 
provoke discussion rather than to present a hypothesis.
Perhaps no event in Soviet history has been 
transformed as rapidly from a “white spot” into a major 
focus of popular consciousness as the Famine of 1932-
33. In contrast to events such as the purges, the Molotov- 
Ribbentrop Pact, and the Katyn massacre, which have 
long received scholarly and popular attention outside the 
Soviet Union, the Famine had been relatively neglected 
by academics and by the Western public until the 1980s. 
The Famine became a subject of scholarly study and 
public attention in the West largely through the efforts of 
the Ukrainian diaspora communities centering on the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Famine in 1983.4 The film, 
Harvest of Despair, the US Congressional Resolution 
and the Commission on the Ukrainian Famine, and the 
International Commission of Enquiry on the Ukrainian
Zenon E. Kohut, Frank E. Sysyn, and Mark von Hagen, eds., Culture,
Nation, and Identity: The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter, 1600-1945
(Toronto-Edmonton, 2003).
4 Frank E. Sysyn, "The Ukrainian Famine of 1932-3: The Role of the 
Ukrainian Diaspora in Research and Public Discussion," in Levron 
Chorbajian and George Shirinian, Studies in Comparative Genocide 
(New York-London, 1999), 182-215.
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Famine brought the event to public attention. Robert 
Conquest's monograph Harvest of Sorrow and the 
publications of James Mace placed the Famine on the 
Western scholarly agenda.5
The period of glasnost in the USSR permitted the 
Famine issue to emerge among the numerous historical 
revelations and re-evaluations of the late 1980s. The issue 
was first broached in Moscow, but by 1989 it took on 
widespread popular resonance in Ukraine. The public 
manifestations, erection of monuments, international 
conferences, and scholarly publications of the 1990s have 
made the Famine one of the central issues of historical 
discussion in contemporary Ukraine.6
For both the Ukrainian diaspora and the Ukrainian 
national movement in Ukraine, the Famine issue has 
functioned as a rallying point. From the 1930s to the 
1990s, anti-Soviet Ukrainians outside the USSR pointed 
to the Famine as proof of the criminal and anti-Ukrainian 
nature of the Soviet regime. Within these circles, the 
Moscow government held responsible was seen as both 
Communist and Russian. The lesson drawn was that only 
an independent Ukraine would have guaranteed against 
such tragedies and could avoid them in the future. The 
refusal of the Soviet government to admit that a famine 
had occurred, much less to admit that it bore 
responsibility, transformed all discussions of the Famine 
into an ideological confrontation. The issue was 
particularly important in right-left polemics, because if 
the Soviet Union was seen as comparable in evil to Nazi 
Germany, all discussions of the Eastern Front of World 
War II took on a different coloration. At the same time, 
Ukrainians in the diaspora found the Famine an 
important means of questioning the stereotype of 
“Ukrainians” as victimizers (Nazi collaborators, 
pogromists) rather than victimized. Attention to the 
Famine also made more explicable why some Ukrainians
5 Robert Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the 
Terror Famine (New York-London, 1986) and James Mace, "Famine 
and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine," Problems of Communism (May- 
June, 1984): 37-57 and "The Man-Made Famine of 1933: What 
Happened and Why," in Israel W. Charny, ed., Toward the 
Understanding and Prevention of Genocide: Proceedings of he 
International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide (Boulder, CO, 
1984), 67-83.
6 Of great importance was the official and still Soviet Holod 1932-
1933 na Ukraini: Ochyma istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv (Kyiv, 1990) 
and the Memorial "opposition" volume L. Kovalenko and V. Maniak,
Holod 33. Narodna knyha-memorial (Kyiv, 1991).
would have little loyalty to the Soviet Union in 1941 or 
might at first have viewed German rule as even a possible 
improvement. The debate on the Famine also influenced 
discussions of the Holocaust for these issues, as well as 
for the significance of the tragedy in explaining the 
brutalization and demoralization of Ukraine's population 
prior to the war.
By the 1980s the Famine had become a central focus 
of identity and rallying point for diaspora Ukrainians who 
aspired to establish an independent Ukrainian state. At 
the end of the decade, it played a similar role in Ukraine. 
As the degree of mendacity of the Soviet propagandists 
about numerous issues became known to wider circles of 
the population of Ukraine, the official negation of the 
Famine crumbled before a groundswell of eyewitness 
testimony. At the same time, the Soviet demonization of 
"Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" lost potency as voices 
were raised against the Russification of Ukraine and the 
sham nature of Soviet internationalism. In 1988-91 a 
general oppositional groundswell arose in Ukraine that 
combined anti-totalitarian, democratic, ecological, 
cultural, religious, and national issues. Its influence 
extended far beyond Rukh, the organized oppositional 
movement that had its main base in western Ukraine. 
Distrust of the authorities and the Moscow-center was 
intensified by the experience of the Chornobyl nuclear 
disaster of 1986. This recent catastrophe made plausible 
the allegations about the Famine and the arguments that 
the Soviet authorities cared little for the people and that 
the Moscow-center treated Ukraine with little regard. For 
the Ukrainian national movement, the Famine issue 
served as an effective vehicle for undermining the 
Communist authorities and the Soviet mythology in 
eastern Ukraine. The national interpretation of the 
Famine current in the Ukrainian diaspora spread in 
Ukraine as the country opened up to contacts with the 
West, and the projects of the 1980s in the West 
legitimized and served as models for activities in 
Ukraine.7 By 1991 even the authorities had come to 
acquiesce that a man-made Famine had occurred in 
Ukraine, though they were reluctant to deal with the issue 
of responsibility.
The August 1991 coup in Moscow and the shift of the 
authorities in Ukraine to a pro-independence stance 
radically changed the political climate in Ukraine. The 
ruling former Communist elite adopted many of the
7 Conquest's book was published in translation in fragments in the 
early 1990s and in full in 1993 in Kyiv as Zhnyva skorboty: Radians'ka 
kolektyvizatsiia i Holodomor.
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symbols of the Ukrainian national movement (the blue- 
and-yellow flag) and elements of the Ukrainian national 
historical vision, including the view of the Famine. 
Attention to the Famine in the Ukrainian media before 
the December 1,1991, referendum was one of the means 
the government used to build pro-independence 
sentiment. The banning of the Communist Party removed 
the organization that could be seen as bearing the 
responsibility for the Famine from Ukrainian public life. 
However one evaluates the adoption of Ukrainian 
national positions by the old elite and its cooptation of the 
agenda of the Ukrainian democratic national movement, 
the government in Kyiv did make the commemoration of 
the Famine one of its elements in establishing the identity 
of the Ukrainian state.
By the time that the Ukrainian government organized 
the commemoration of the Ukrainian Famine's sixtieth 
anniversary in mid-1993, the economic crisis in the new 
state and its failure to find adequate support in the West 
had made an increasingly weary population wary of 
Ukrainian independence and apathetic toward public 
issues. The re-emergence of the Communist Party and of 
pro-Russian and pro-Soviet sympathies in late 1993 and 
1994 also changed the political and cultural climate in 
Ukraine. Those forces that had found the 
commemoration of the Famine inconvenient and the 
interpretation of the event by the Ukrainian national 
movement unacceptable had more influence at a national 
level. Certainly, the Famine had receded as a public issue 
by 1995 as the Kuchma government returned to many of 
the propagandists of the old order for setting the cultural- 
political agenda. Despite the financial crisis in Ukrainian 
scholarship and publishing, scholarly and popular writing 
on the Famine, including indictments of the tragedy as a 
Soviet or even Russian genocide against the Ukrainian 
nation, continued.8 With the subsequent falling out of the 
Communists with the Kuchma regime and the oligarchs 
in the late 1990s, the Famine issue could be more readily 
embraced by the government, even if only as a way of 
dealing with the patriotic segment of the Ukrainian 
electorate. Hence the presidential ukaz on the Famine in 
2002 opened the way for greater attention to the Famine 
in 2003 as part of presidential political tactics.
Discussions of the Famine have centered on a number 
of controversies. Arguments that a Famine did not occur, 
that it was the result of drought or poor harvests, or that it 
was the result of anarchy during the collectivization drive
8 See the report on the Second Congress of Famine Researchers in 
December 1994 in News from Ukraine 1995. np. 1.
have generally been discredited.9 Although assertions 
that deaths from the Famine losses were limited have 
been abandoned, the number of millions of demographic 
losses is still debated. Intentionality and responsibility for 
the disaster remain disputed. While assertions that the 
Famine had no specific geographic limits have ceased, 
debates continue over whether it resulted from similar 
policies in all grain-growing regions in the Soviet Union. 
In particular, assertions that it occurred because of 
specific policies toward Ukraine, that anti-Ukrainian 
attitudes explain the failure to render assistance or that 
the Famine was planned are still hotly debated.
In the initial controversies in the West, the debates 
were largely between representatives of the Ukrainian 
diaspora and scholars who defended some of their 
viewpoints, and representatives of the Soviet government 
and scholars who opposed these views, some of whom 
held pro-Soviet, Ukrainophobe, or Russophilic views. 
The Famine also became a point of controversy in the 
debates of the Revisionists and their opponents. Of late, 
the increasing scholarly attention to the Famine and the 
ability to research specific topics with access to archival 
materials and demographic data in the former Soviet 
Union have reduced the ideological heat surrounding the 
topic. More and more of the scholarship is written in 
Ukraine and Russia. While the Famine is not a major 
public issue in Russia, Russian scholars have taken 
positions on the issue of whether the Famine had a 
specific Ukrainian character.10 In this way, the issue of 
the Famine has emerged as an incident of Russian- 
Ukrainian issues in the 1930s as well as in contemporary 
relations.
The demographic consequence of the Famine is an 
essential issue for Russian-Ukrainian relations. The 
twentieth century was a period in which the demographic 
balance of Ukrainians and Russians shifted drastically in 
favor of the latter. In 1926, there were 78,453,000 
Russians and 34,882,000 Ukrainians in the territories of 
the former Soviet Union (as well as the western 
Ukrainian territories later annexed), a ratio of 2.25 
Russians to one Ukrainian.11 By 1959, there were
9 One scholar making some of these arguments is Mark B. Tauger. 
See his Natural Disaster and Human Actions in the Soviet Famine of 
1931-1933 (Pittsburgh, 2001) (The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and 
East European Studies, no. 1506).
10 V. P. Danilov, “Diskussiia v zapadnoi presse o golode 1932-33 
gg. i ‘demograficheskoi katastrofe' 30-40kh godov v SSSR,”
Voprosy istorii, 3 (1998):116-21.
11 Population statistics come from Ralph Clem, "Demographic
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114,114,000 Russians and 37,253,000 Ukrainians (a ratio 
of 3.06 to 1), and by 1989 there were 145,072,000 and 
44,136,000 (a ratio of 3.29 to 1). In other terms, while 
Ukrainians were outnumbered by Russians by 2.25 to 1 
in 1926, for every one addition to the number of 
Ukrainians over the next 63 years (a total of 9,254,000), 
there were an additional 7.2 Russians (66,619,000). The 
fighting of World War II on Ukrainian territories, 
resulting in large civilian casualties, partially explains 
this phenomenon. Events such as the Famine of 1947 
encompassed all of Ukraine and only parts of Russia. The 
emigration of many Ukrainians to Russia and the 
assimilation of the Ukrainian communities in Russia, 
particularly rapid since the abolition of Ukrainian cultural 
institutions in the 1930s and the arbitrary reclassification 
of Ukrainians as Russians in Kuban and other regions, 
also offer a partial explanation. In addition, numerous 
Ukrainians in Ukraine in those years designated 
themselves as Russians and the children of mixed 
marriages showed a preference for Russian nationality. 
Yet these factors are not sufficient to explain the relative 
demographic decline of Ukrainians, particularly in 
Ukraine itself. From 1926 to 1959, within the borders of 
the pre-1939 Ukrainian SSR, the Ukrainian population 
increased by only 1,879,000 (from 23,219,000 to 
25,098,000), while the Russian population increased by 
3,160,000 (from 2,676,000 to 5,836,000).12
The Famine of 1932-33 played a significant role in 
this relative decline of Ukrainians within the Soviet 
Union as a whole and in Soviet Ukraine in particular. The 
exact figures of the victims of the Famine are still being 
disputed, but by the mid-1990s the new sources and 
research in Ukraine showed how disproportionately 
Ukraine had suffered during the Famine. Robert 
Conquest had estimated 5 million losses in Ukraine and 2 
million in Russia, of whom, he estimated, probably 1 
million were Ukrainians because of the geography of the 
Famine in Russia. (He also estimated 1 million Kazakh 
losses in 1932, but did not see this tragedy as part of the 
policies that brought about the Famine). In his studies in
Change among Russians and Ukrainians in the Soviet Union: Social, 
Economic, and Political Implications," in Peter Potichnyj et. al. eds., 
Ukraine and Russia in their Historical Encounter (Edmonton, 1992),
288.
12 Data is taken from Bohdan Krawchenko, Social Change and 
National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine (n.p., 1985), 176, 
with the population of Crimea, taken from the article in the 
Encyclopedia of Ukraine, subtracted from the southern region.
the mid-1990s, Stephen Wheatcroft raised his estimate of 
mortality from the Famine of 1932-33 upward from 3-4 
million to 4-5 million.13 While he did not give absolute 
figures for Ukraine, he estimated that the elevation of 
mortality in Ukraine in 1933 was 189.5 percent compared 
to 51.7 percent in Russia and 23.6 percent in Belarus, that 
the Ukrainian oblasts of Kyiv and Kharkiv had the 
highest rates anywhere in the USSR (respectively 268.4 
and 281.3 percent), and that it was high even in non-
grain-growing regions of Ukraine such as Chernihiv (111 
percent).14 Stanislav Kul'chyts'kyi argued that Wheatcroft 
underestimated the number of deaths, and on the basis of 
the 1937 census argued there were 3 to 3.5 million deaths 
in Ukraine and 1 to 1.3 million unborn childen because of 
the Famine.15 A. Maksudov estimated 4.5 to 5 million 
demographic loss in Ukraine and a Soviet total of 7 
million, in which he included Kazakh losses, while Alec 
Nove accepted Conquest's figure as essentially correct if 
"somewhat too high for the Ukraine, but somewhat too 
low for Kazakhstan."16 In sum, the demographic losses 
variously estimated as 4 to 7 million were predominantly 
in Ukraine, which had less than a third of the population 
that Russia did. In addition, many of the areas of Russia 
affected by the Famine such as Kuban had high 
percentages of Ukrainian population. In essence, the 
Famine represented a demographic disaster for Ukraine 
and the Ukrainian population of the Soviet Union on a 
scale that it did not for Russia and the Russian 
population. Therefore, the Famine provides an important 
part of the explanation of the decline of Ukrainians in 
relation to Russians within the entire former Soviet 
Union.
Within Soviet Ukraine, the Famine reduced the 
Ukrainian and increased the Russian percentage of the 
population. The relatively high Ukrainian birthrate made 
for a rapidly growing Ukrainian population in the 
republic and an increase of their percentage throughout 
the 1920s and into the early 1930s. Yet from 1926 to
13 Stephen Wheatcroft, "More Light on the Scale of Repression and 
the Excess Mortality in the Soviet Union in the 1930s," in J. Arch Getty 
and Roberta Manning, eds. Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives 
(Cambridge, 1993), 280.
14 Wheatcroft, 282.
15 Unpublished paper "Ukrainian Demographic Losses from the 
Famine in 1932-33 according to the General Census of the Ukrainian 
Population in 1937" (1994).
16 Alec Nove, "Victims of Stalinism: How Many?" in Getty and 
Manning, Stalinist Terror, 266,274.
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1937, Ukrainians decreased by 433,000 (1.9 percent), 
while Russians increased by 904,000 (39 percent).17 This 
represented a shift from 1 Russian for every 9.77 
Ukrainians to 1 Russian for every 6.89 Ukrainians. The 
rural-urban difference of national composition ensured 
that Ukrainians made up a higher percentage of victims 
of the Famine than was their percentage in the general 
population, while the more urbanized Russians in 
Ukraine were likely to have a smaller proportion of 
victims. (In 1926, 77 percent of Jews and 50 percent of 
Russians lived in the cities, but only 10 percent of 
Ukrainians.)18 Some of this change occurred because of 
migration into Ukraine after the Famine, including into 
rural areas.
By a rapid decimation of the fecund Ukrainian 
village, the Famine reduced its potential to serve as the 
source of urban migrants in the future. While it is 
difficult to differentiate the impact of the Famine from 
that of World War II on the Ukrainian village, the reasons 
for the massive Russian influx into Ukraine from 1926 to 
1959 can only be explained by the reduced population 
increase in the rural areas that were in pre-1939 Soviet 
Ukraine. Had it not been for the west Ukrainian village as 
a source of population growth and migrants, that influx 
might have been even greater. Nevertheless, by 1959 
there were only 4.30 Ukrainians in the area of pre-1939 
Ukraine for every Russian (3.79 if Crimea is included).19
The Famine also had significant impact on the nature 
of Ukrainian-Russian linguistic and cultural relations in 
Ukraine. The demographic change only partially explains 
this shift. The cessation of Ukrainianization and the 
attacks on Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism undermined 
the position of the Ukrainian language and the status of 
Ukrainians. They accompanied the collectivization and 
assault on the Ukrainian village, the traditional bearer of 
the Ukrainian language and culture. This would have 
favored the Russian language and the Russian-based 
Soviet proletarian culture in any case. Nevertheless, had 
the Famine not decimated the village, wiped out so many 
bearers of Ukrainian language and traditional culture, 
produced a generation of orphans who did not remember
17 “National Composition of Ukraine,” Encyclopedia of Ukraine, 3 
(Toronto, 1993), 542. The statistics for both Ukrainians and Russians in 
1926 are somewhat smaller than in the data taken from Krawchenko 
above, presumably because of a different interpretation of the borders of 
Ukraine.
18 Krawchenko, 50.
19 Krawchenko, 176, see note 2.
their elders, issued forth a stream of refugees to the 
industrial centers who wished to forget the horror they 
had endured in the villages and in many cases had no 
relatives left there, Ukrainian language and identity 
would have been more resilient and Russification would 
have proceeded more slowly.
Discussion of the Famine also involves the question 
of whether Ukraine and Ukrainians were targeted for 
persecution and discrimination by the Soviet system as 
well as the degree to which this system and its elite 
should be seen as Russian. Three issues remain at the 
core of the question of special treatment of Ukraine 
before and during the Famine.
The first is whether Ukraine was treated differently 
than other republics of the Soviet Union in the 
apportioning of grain requisitions. Some scholars argue 
that Ukraine was treated no differently than other grain-
growing regions of Russia. This contention must 
demonstrate that all grain-growing regions of Russia 
were affected to the degree of grain-growing regions in 
Ukraine. It also must explain why the non-grain-growing 
areas of Ukraine seem to have been affected more than 
the non-grain-growing regions of Russia were, and in 
some cases more than grain-growing regions were.
The second issue involves the question of whether the 
refusal to listen to the Kyiv leadership's pleas on the 
Famine and the willingness to permit massive losses of 
life constituted a Moscow-centric indifference or even an 
anti-Ukraine or an anti-Ukrainian bias. The question of 
the place and treatment of Ukraine and Russia within the 
Soviet Union during the Famine must be examined. 
Central to this discussion is the question of closing 
Ukraine's borders. This question initially evoked much 
controversy in the West, including the dismissal of 
survivor testimony, and has ultimately been proven by 
documentary evidence. This issue also involves the 
attitudes of the Soviet elite and, above all, of Stalin 
toward Ukraine and Ukrainians.
The third issue relates to whether or not the actions of 
the Kremlin or of the Soviet government can be seen as 
Russian, especially in light of Stalin's Georgian origins. 
This issue involves the complex gamut of questions of 
the degree to which the Soviet Union was a successor to 
the Russian Empire and maintained Russian imperialist 
or nationalist polices. The question has become even 
more complicated with the emergence of a Russian state 
that is viewed and often views itself as the successor state 
of the USSR. In popular perception in the former non-
Russian republics, the wedding of Russian identity and 
Russian language to Soviet identity and pro-Communist 
sentiment in the post-independence era has strengthened
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this view. In examining the situation in Ukraine in the 
1930s, “Russian” and “Ukrainian” relate to complex 
social (urban-rural), political (the national composition 
and linguistic characteristics of the CP) and cultural 
characteristics. In examining the Famine of 1932-33, 
topics such as the national composition of the twenty-five 
thousanders relate to the question of Russian-Ukrainian 
relations, and in particular stereotypes.
Numerous questions remain unresolved in the study 
of the Famine of 1932-33. As they are studied, the 
research will permit more informed discussion of the 
relevance of the Famine for Russian-Ukrainian relations. 
Clearly the Famine had a great impact on the 
demographic relations of Ukrainians and Russians and on 
the linguistic and cultural situation in Ukraine. More 
complex is the significance of the Famine as an event in 
Russian-Ukrainian relations and the attitudes of various 
groups of the two peoples toward each other. Differing 
interpretations of the Famine and its differing function in 
popular consciousness also affect Russian-Ukrainian 
contemporary relations. Examination of many of these 
topics will assist in our conceptualization of Russian- 
Ukrainian relations in the Soviet period.
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